Not without you, I won't: Special utterance types in FG
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1. Introduction

FG assumes that natural language is primarily a communicative system and, as such, it should be investigated not only from the syntactic, semantic and phonological points of view but also, crucially, from a pragmatic perspective. It follows that establishing the possible correlations between the pragmatic factors on the one hand and their syntactic and semantic correspondences on the other should constitute the ultimate goal of linguistic theory.

Since the pragmatic nature of language is evident in discourse, it is only natural that discourse segments should constitute the object of research. Yet, so far as I know, most studies within this theoretical approach concentrate on sentence level sequences and hence no alternative is proposed for the analysis of certain utterance types which lack the features regularly associated with sentences, but occur in a variety of discourse sequences. In the present paper I will investigate a peculiar utterance type which shows interesting syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties and which seems to require a discourse sequence as part of its frame of reference or even as a unit of analysis. I will propose the adoption of the appropriate mechanism by FG that would enable a satisfactory account of such linguistic entities.

2. Characterization of the construction

The construction in question is the one mentioned in the title. It has a very characteristic structure: it is invariably introduced by *not* followed by a variety of clauses and phrases as the second constituent. This constituent is followed by a nominative pronoun, which is, in turn, followed by a negative auxiliary. No other element may follow the auxiliary. The construction in question constitutes a single fall plus rise intonational unit.

Consider:

(1) a. Will you go there?
   \ /  
   b. Not without you, I won't (*go there).  

(2) a. Did he complain about the service?
   \ /  
   b. Not to me, he didn't(*complain).

(3) a. What will she do next?
   \ /  
   b. Not go back to her husband, she won't.

(4) a. What will he do with her?
   b. Not make her his assistant, he won't.

(5) a. Can they join us?
   b. Not this evening, they can't.
It is evident that the construction in question can serve as a reply to both polar and WH interrogatives, under the appropriate contextual assumptions. It can, however, occur quite comfortably also in non-interrogative contexts where it is used to correct some misperception or modify the information as in:

(11)  a. He will get here as soon as he can.
     b. Not if his sister arrives, he won't.

There are certain obvious constraints on the occurrence of these constructions such as the requirement that the information contained in the constituent following not be focal, hence non-predictable and salient. I will not elaborate here on the pragmatic restrictions constraining the distribution of the relevant construction, rather, I would like to restrict my attention in the present paper to the question of its sentential status; namely, the question whether it is a sentence and as such should be accounted for by sentence grammar, or whether it is a discourse unit which does not have to obey the rules of sentence grammar, but is subject to discourse principles, instead.

3. Sentential status

In this section I shall examine the sentential status of the construction under investigation both within a grammatical theory that entertains the possibility of syntactic movements and within the theoretical framework of FG, where no such movements are allowed.

3.1 The fronting derivation

Quirk et al. mention this construction as an instance of "fronting with amplificatory tagging" (1985: 1418). This claim is rather puzzling, since in those models of grammar which consider it an instance of fronting it should be fronting out of a clause, and accordingly the second part of
the construction, the one characterized by rising intonation, should not, in fact, could not, be conceived of as a tag. Underlying this suggested derivation is the assumption that the construction in question properly belongs to sentence grammar. In addition, the fact that this construction constitutes one intonational unit, could, following Halliday (1967: 202 - 203), be regarded as indicative of its informational status as one informational unit.iii If we take into account the tacit (but erroneous) assumption often made by linguists that one intonational unit cannot correspond to more than one sentence, then we will come up with the proposal to regard the structural unit under examination as a sentence.iv

Let us examine the fronting hypothesis in some detail. The major problem with this derivational proposal clearly pertains to the source of the initial negation. Is the initial negative a copy of the main clause negation? Under what conditions can we copy the negative element in the main clause unto one of the other constituents in the sentence? Note that this is not an instance of double negation as the difference between (4b)(above and repeated here) and (4b') indicates:

(4) b. Not make her his assistant, he won't.
(4) b'. He won't not make her his assistant.

An attempt at a fronting derivation of sentences like (1b) from a syntactically related sentence (1b'), which in discourse functional terms seems to constitute a direct reply in the same context (1a), appears problematic, as a non-unitary account for such sentences would emerge, in light of the relationship between (3b) and (3b') and both of them vis a`vis (3a). Consider:

(1) a. Will you go there?
(1) b. Not without you, I won't.
(1) b'. I won't, not without you.

and:

(3) a. What will she do next?
(3) b. Not go back to her husband, she won't.
(3) b'. She won't, not go back to her husband.

Whereas (1b') can function as a direct reply to (1a), with the negative phrase not without you serving as a modification of the immediately preceding response, (3b') could not be construed as a possible reply to (3a). No possible derivation is available, then, for (3b) from (3b') which is non-ad-hoc. The lack of parallelism in the potential sources of the constructions under investigation constitutes a major drawback in any attempt to provide a principled, unitary account in terms of fronting.v

3.2. FG derivation

The theoretical framework FG provides where no fronting is possible would, presumably, generate
the construction under investigation as it is. However, even this is not straightforward. Under the
assumption that this is an instance of a sentential entity, one available option would make the
initial negative constituent either a theme, or a topic, neither being intuitively or, for that
matter, empirically justifiable. Clearly, no 'aboutness' is involved in the relationship that obtains
between the two parts of the construction. Likewise, the decision whether the initial negative
constituent is integrated within clause structure and as such functions as Topic, or whether it is
not and hence serves as Theme (cf. Dik 1978: 130), crucially depends on the status of such
arguments as were used in arguing for the fronting hypothesis.

An alternative proposal within the current version of FG which still preserves the
assumption that the construction represents one illocutionary act was brought to my attention by L.
Mackenzie (personal communication). According to this analysis the constituent following not is regarded as the focal
element left behind by ellipsis and the second part of the construction is analyzed in terms of a
level 4 operator of assertivity. The ellipsis analysis seems to pose problems if taken literally in
view of the restrictions on deletions within FG. Thus, Dik (1989: 18) states that deletions of
specified elements are to be avoided within FG. And in his analysis of focal responses in a
question answer sequence as in:

(12) Where is John going?
(a) John is going to the market.
(b) To the market.

(Dik 1989: 279 his (36)) he proposes that such replies as in (12b) represent a speech act where only
one entity is specified explicitly. No syntactic reconstruction is operative, only contextual
reconstruction is available. Hence, discourse-pragmatic clues are required for the interpretation.
As for the second part of the construction under examination, the proposal that it be analyzed as
a level 4 operator amplifying the assertivity of the relevant speech act, rather than a level 4
satellite, is based on the observation that it consists of no new lexical material. The assertivity is
indicated grammatically by a negative auxiliary and thus abides by the criterion of operators.

An additional question pertaining to the analysis of the construction under examination
within the current FG framework has to do with ECC (Extra Clausal Constituents). The problem
in the present context is whether any constituent in the relevant construction is to be regarded as
an ECC. Dik (1989: 264) mentions that ECC exist alongside fragments of clauses and states
without further argument that a difference can be made between the two. The construction under
examination is precisely a case in point. To the extent that the second part acts like a tag, then it
should be analyzed accordingly and accorded the status of an ECC. However, in all the instances
examined so far ECCs seem to cooccur with full clauses. To the extent that this is an essential
property of ECCs, the status of the first part of the construction will have to be determined as
either clausal but elliptic or else non-clausal. The final account will depend on the principled
answers to these queries. An alternative theoretical possibility, admittedly less likely, could be
considered in the same context, namely, that the initial part of the construction be regarded as an
ECC added on to the second (ellipted?) clause. Here too the final solution awaits a non-ad-hoc
treatment of such construction types in terms of clausal status.
4. Discourse unit

The failure to come up with an insightful and principled account in terms of sentence grammar for the construction under investigation as well as the intuition that we are dealing with an instance of an utterance which constitutes a discourse segment, rather than a sentence, seems to advocate a non-sentential treatment for the construction at hand. Consequently, to the extent that this construction will be shown to abide by certain syntactic restrictions, they will have to be accounted for not by reference to sentence grammar, but rather by reference to discourse-pragmatic principles. Such an approach seems likely in view of the fact that certain syntactic processes are known to occur intersententially. Thus, such elliptic phenomena as VP ellipsis (Williams 1977: 101 - 102) and Gapping (Mittwoch 1985: 142 - 143) and, clearly, anaphoric phenomena (Reinhart 1986, ms.; Zribi-Hertz 1989: 706 - 715) occur across sentence boundaries. The type of connection between the two parts of the construction in question will, thus, not constitute a unique case of intersentential dependency. On the other hand, as a non-sentential entity the construction under investigation will not be expected to show any sentential constraints and, thus, whatever restrictions it does show will be attributed to the discourse structure. I will come back to this issue shortly.

If we make the assumption that the relevant construction is an instance of a discourse entity, then we would expect it to behave much like the same sequence in discourse organized in 2 informational units rather than 1. Specifically, we would expect there to be no real difference between the behaviour of sequences such as in (1), where the information is packaged in one intonational unit corresponding to one informational unit, and sequences such as in (13) where the information is organized in two distinct intonational units, and in clearly two distinct informational units.

(13) a. Will you go there?  
b. Not without you. I won't (go there (without you)).

However, the two differ significantly syntactically as well as pragmatically. Thus, the construction under investigation does not tolerate the occurrence of any material following the negative auxiliary, ellipsis may be conceived of as obligatory in this context, whereas the sequence in (13) shows ellipsis only optionally, and hence the range of well-formedness both without the material in parentheses and with the material in parentheses either in part or in full. Likewise, the construction under investigation was shown to exhibit a restriction in terms of focal material, such that only unpredictable material, and clearly not material that occurs verbatim in the previous context can occur as the first constituent, the sequence with two intonational units need not be so constrained. Hence the difference between (14) and (15):

(14) a. Could you be more patient?  
b. Not more patient, I couldn't.

(15) a. Could you be more patient?  
b. Not more patient, I couldn't be more patient.

The two also differ in their discourse functions. The second constituent in the construction under
investigation serves an amplifying function whereas the second informational unit in the sequence with two informational units functions as an explication or justification. It provides the rationale for the short reply in the immediately preceding string; it functions as a "softner". The question should now arise as to how these differences are to be captured. Any theory of language which attempts to account for the communicative function of language ought to be able to capture such differences systematically. \(^{vii}\)

Under the reasonable assumption that the relevant construction constitutes an instance of a discourse segment, we would not expect it to show any sentential properties. The following observations indicating that the relevant construction seems to be subject to some version of Ross' island constraints (subjacency) constitute a problem for this assumption. Thus consider:

(16) a. Will you see the boys and will you meet the girls ?
    b. *?? Not the big boys, I won't.

(17) a. Could I see the picture that the members of my family bought you ?
    b. * Not your big brother, you couldn't.

(18) a. That John would vote for a woman would not be believed by anyone who knows him.
    b. * Not for a young woman, it wouldn't.

The sentences in (16), (17) and (18) indicate that the construction in question abides by the coordinate-structure constraint, the complex NP constraint and the sentential subject constraint respectively. Such findings have characteristically forced linguists of certain convictions not only to assume that the relevant structures are sentential, but also, to assume that they involve movement to initial position, since Ross islands were conceived of as constraints on leftward movement rules. Alternatively, these constraints were regarded as obtaining in certain structural configurations, again, the orientation being clearly sentential.

If, however, we construe these constraints not as constraints on sentences with a certain history of derivation or manifesting certain structural configurations but rather as constraints on informational units, then the evidence from islands need not force us to consider the construction under examination an ordinary type of sentence. Such a view of subjacency would seem to be substantiated by evidence from both the behaviour of fragments and the behavior of interjections. James (1972: 167 - 169) and Morgan (1973: 737) have shown that interjections and fragment replies are sensitive to island constraints. Hence:

(19) a. Did John and Mary leave this morning ?
    b. * No, (and) Harry.

(20) a. Did the man who shot Lincoln go to Russia ?
    b. * No, Kennedy.

(21) a. John's seeing Martha upset the president, didn't it?
    b. * No, Thelma.

(22) Ah, the sun is shining and there's not much wind.

(23) Ah, John bought his car from a man who says that Bush is a vegetarian.

(24) Ah, that Bush is a vegetarian is reported by Newsweek.

In (19) (20) and (21) fragments are shown to be inappropriate with coordinate structures, complex
NP's and sentential subjects respectively, whereas in (23), (23) and (24) the interjection *ah* affects the whole construction and does not "penetrate" the island in question. Thus, both conjuncts are affected in (23) and the main clause, rather than the subordinate clause, is affected in both (23) and (24). It is fairly clear that no sound linguist would claim that interjections should properly be included in sentence grammar and any attempt to derive fragments from full sentences via ellipsis (proposed in Morgan 1973: 723) is likely to run into insurmountable problems. (cf. Yanofsky 1978: 491 - 493 and Barton 1990: 23 - 41 for explicit arguments)

Rather, the evidence gathered from interjections and fragments seems to point to an informational rationale for so-called island constraints. The constraints should, accordingly, be construed as constraints on information units which are conceptually rather than purely syntactically motivated. This view is supported by such approaches to island phenomena as are evident in Kuno (1976: 420, 1980), Grosu (1981: 227 - 314) and Shir - Lappin (1979: 43 - 51) where thematization, illocutionary units, and speakers' intentions are regarded as criterial. This approach would suggest that indeed obeying island constraints need not count as compelling evidence for sentencehood. Rather, an explanation in terms of processing of informational units would suggest itself in such cases. This constraint would, presumably, also be realized by certain structural patterns making up certain informational units. The structural aspect would thus constitute but a reflection of the deep rooted informationally oriented restriction.

5. Non-sentential utterances and implications for FG

5.1. Non-sentential utterances

We have witnessed, so far, that there exist in language special utterance types which display systematic syntactic, semantic and pragmatic characteristics which distinguish them from regular sentences on the one hand and from distinct sequences of utterances in discourse on the other. Any approach to language which is functionally oriented ought to account for these constructions in a principled manner. The existence of non-sentential utterance types has been independently recognized elsewhere. Thus, for instance, various NP utterances as in:

(25)  
   a. *Your tie!*
   b. *Nurse!*

and the like, which clearly cannot be uniquely recoverable under any ellipsis assumption, (cf. discussion in Yanofsky 1978: 491 - 493 and Barton 1990: 23 - 41) have been used to argue for the introduction in the grammar of non-sentential utterances which are clearly part of our linguistic competence in a given language.

Barton (1990) provides an account of non-sentential constituents in terms of two interacting components -- what she calls the competence module, which is the syntactic and semantic component, and the pragmatic module, which is further divided into linguistic and conversational subcomponents. The competence module generates well-formed non-sentential constituents with their proper syntactic and semantic representation. Since Barton adopts the autonomy of syntax hypothesis crucially associated with Chomsky's GB framework (of which Barton's account is presumably a part), the output of this (grammatical) competence component
(Logical Form) greatly underspecifies interpretation. The interpretation of the independent, non-sentential constituents is handled by the pragmatic component with its linguistic and its non-linguistic (conversational) submodules. The linguistic submodule accounts for the operation of discourse inference, by recreating the relevant aspects of the linguistic structure within the discourse sequence. Reference to syntactic characteristics such as subcategorization of verbs and to semantic characteristics such as thematic role assignment (e.g. Agent, Patient) in the interpretation of non-sentential utterances is carried out via the pragmatic module by the replication of these syntactic and semantic properties in its linguistic context sub-part. This redundancy in structural and semantic information is a necessary evil in a model that preserves the autonomy thesis. Rather than claiming that the interpretation of certain discourse sequences which are not sentential has recourse to purely syntactic and/or semantic information, the autonomy thesis forces one into a duplication of the relevant syntactic and semantic properties in both the purely grammatical component of the linguistic theory and in some part of its pragmatic component.

The second submodule of the pragmatic component within Barton's theory is the conversational context. This subpart of the pragmatic component works on the output of the conversational context (which we saw replicates certain syntactic and semantic properties) and utilizing general Gricean principles like cooperative inference yields a full interpretation of the constituent in question.

Despite its intolerable redundancy Barton's account provides a non-ad-hoc means to cope with such structural linguistic entities as were not accounted for before.

5.2. Implications for FG

FG with its emphasis on communication ought to provide the appropriate mechanism for the insightful and principled description of sentential as well as non-sentential linguistic expressions. As far as the pertinent syntactic and semantic properties are concerned, a determination of the relevant topicality, thematicity and clausal issues alongside the operator vs. satellite questions (cf. 3.2 above) awaits further research within FG. However, the major theoretical issue of the place in the overall linguistic theory of such construction types and the type of approach appropriately applied in their description can, and in fact should, be insightfully characterized within the theoretical mechanisms that FG provides.

Dik (1989:4) states that as a communicatively oriented theory of language FG "should not be content to display the rules and principles underlying the construction of linguistic expressions for their own sake, but should try, wherever this is possible at all, to explain these rules and principles in terms of their functionality with respect to the ways in which these expressions are used." The obvious difference between the basic assumptions evident in syntactically autonomous theories of language and some version of FG with respect to the potential interactions between syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors predict a distinct type of account of such special utterances within each of these frameworks. Where syntactic properties seem to be involved in the determination of some aspect of the interpretation of a given linguistic expression FG would make the syntactic information directly accessible to the pragmatic component. Since the 'functional paradigm' regards pragmatics as the framework within which syntax and semantics must be studied, there is no unnecessary duplication of syntactic
information both in the syntactic component and in the pragmatic component required in accounting for the potential interaction between the two components in FG. Consequently, an account of the type advocated by Barton would be considerably simplified if adapted to FG, on the one hand, and would provide a natural explanation for the various syntactic-pragmatic correspondences, on the other.
Footnotes

i... The starred sequence in the parentheses indicates that no continuation is possible following the negative auxiliary.

ii... This requirement could be used to explain the relative oddity of such interchanges as in:

(i) Could you be more patient?
    * ?? Not more patient, I couldn't.

(ii) Would you drink the beer?
    * ?? Not the beer, I wouldn't.

The material following not in these examples is given and hence predictable.

iii... Halliday excludes from this correspondence between tone units and information units certain instances determined by rhythm.

iv... The same assumption is evident in attempts to derive final parentheticals from main clauses via a variety of transformations. (cf. discussion in Ziv 1985: 181 - 188)

v... The fronting hypothesis would presumably attempt to establish a parallelism between topicalization and the construction under investigation. The obvious differences between the two constructions in terms of the triggering factors for the movement of certain constituents may be considered a reason for distinguishing them, depending on the type of interaction between the syntactic, the semantic and the pragmatic factors that the particular linguistic theory espoused adopts. Thus, VP preposing must occur under very different conditions than the fronting of the VP evident in the construction at hand. (cf. Ward 1985: 219 - 266 and 1990 for a discussion of VP preposing.) VP preposing characteristically occurs with given information, often, if not always verbatim, as in:

(i) He promised that he will make her his assistant
    and make her his assistant, he did.

whereas in the cases under examination such givenness seems to either rule out the sentence or else to make it very marginal.

(ii) Will he make her his assistant?
    * ?? Not make her his assistant, he won't.

These data indicate that we cannot account for the distinctions between the two in terms of different mappings between syntax and pragmatics.

vi... McGregor (forthcoming) proposes that Theme be regarded as a linking device
that establishes "an anchor point for the clause" from 4 different perspectives: experiential, logical, interpersonal and textual. Sentences could thus have several themes simultaneously. In applying his proposal to the type of construction discussed in my paper he claims that it has three themes: an interpersonal theme (the constituent in the scope of not) and an experiential theme (the initial constituent of the "statement tag"). I find the multiplicity of uses of the notion theme and the corresponding concept of 'aboutness' reduced to vacuity and in danger of circularity in the absence of clear criteria with definite predictive power. The analysis of the construction in question in terms of several themes is thus clearly non-insightful.

I may speculate at this point that the answer would lie in the proper utilization of some version of Levinson's (1987: 61 - 79) maxim of minimization which states that the speaker should use the minimal linguistic clues sufficient to achieve his communicative ends. (This speaker oriented maxim has as immediate corollary an addressee's maxim of inferential maximization.) Accordingly, the argument could be made that once the speaker packages his response in one informational unit, he is taken to convey one communicative goal. In the present context this amounts to some modification of a negative response. However, assuming some version of the minimization maxim, once the speaker introduces essentially the same propositional content in two informational units, there must be reason for it; namely, more seems to be implied than the mere propositional content. Following the principle of relevance (whichever version of it is ultimately adopted) the two informational units bear some relevance relationship to each other, the most evident one that comes to mind in the present context is an explication, elaboration or softening as the case may be.(cf. also Ziv 1988: 536 - 541 for a critical discussion of relevance which might bear on the issues at hand.)

Polanyi (1988: 604 - 610) portrays the basics of a formal model of the structure of discourse. A model along the lines that she proposes would seem to be required somewhere in an overall theory of non-sentential discourse entities. Polanyi's DCUs (Discourse Constituent Units), however, do not draw the distinction concentrated on in the present context between clausal and non-clausal constituents.