Hebrew *kaze* as a Discourse Marker and Lexical Hedge: Conceptual and Procedural Properties[1]

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1. Introduction

The distinction between 'conceptual' and 'procedural' meaning (made explicit in these and other terms in Blakemore (1987) and Recanati (1987), *inter alia*) expresses the intuition that there are different aspects of linguistically encoded information. Thus, alongside truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional senses and saying and conventionally implicating, differences have been argued to exist between describing and indicating, and between representational and computational aspects of interpretation. Various analyses of discourse markers adopt some version of these distinctions and account for the different properties these markers display in terms of procedural rather than conceptual meanings. Thus, Blakemore (1987,1992), for example, regards the particular procedural features as imposing semantic constraints on the relevant inferential processes (cf. also Blass (1990 and 1996) and Rouchota (1996 and this volume)) and Jucker (1993) specifies the features characteristically associated with discourse markers as:
(a) not affecting truth conditionality determination, (b) not contributing to the propositional content, (c) relating to the speech situation, and (d) displaying emotive but no referential / denotative function. In this paper I will examine the characteristics of a particular discourse marker in Modern Hebrew, the lexical item *kaze* ('like this'). The analysis of its distributional features along with its semantic properties will be shown to display both conceptual and procedural characteristics and thus challenge the presumed dichotomy between the two on the one hand and the characterization of discourse markers, on the other.[2]

2. Hebrew *kaze* : A pretheoretical description

In Modern Hebrew *kaze* (consisting of the prefix *k(a)* 'like' and the demonstrative *ze* 'this') functions both as a modifier in a nominal or adjectival phrase and as an adverbial discourse marker.[3] In its realization as a modifier, *kaze* displays the characteristic agreement with the noun or adjective with which it co-occurs and may either precede or follow it, as in:

(1a) bayit   kaze
    house (M)   like this (M)

(1b) kaze   bayit
    such (M.SG) house

(2) agada   kazot
   legend (F)   like this (F)

(3a) batim   kaele / kaelu
      houses (M.PL)   like these

(3b) agadot   kaele / kaelu
      legends (F.PL) like these

In its use as an adverbial discourse marker, *kaze* naturally does not manifest the various morphological realizations in the feminine and in the plural and occurs invariably as *kaze*.
        The adverbial *kaze* pre or post modifies whole VP's, (as in (4) and (5)) main verbs (as in (6)), and constituents functioning predicatively (as in (7)): [ ] indicates material in its scope.

(4) bahatxala   ze [hevix   oti]   kaze (*taatuon* p.15)
      at the beginning it [embarrassed me] sort of/like this

(5) im miSehu holex kaze [liftoax xanut   mircono] (*taatuon* p.13)
      if anybody goes sort of [to open a store out of his will]

(6) Seanaxnu yexolim [lehafxid] kaze et   habecim Selahem (*taatuon* p.12)
      that we   can   [to frighten] like ACC the balls their
      'That we can like frighten their balls.'

(7) haknisa   elav [mugefet] kaze   besorgey barzel (*taatuon* p.43)
      the entrance to it [closed]   like   with iron bars
      'The entrance to it is like closed with iron bars.'

The two instances of *kaze* differ also in their potential for accentuation. Only the modifying or intensifying *kaze* can be accented, the adverbial discourse marker cannot be accented. Yet another syntactic distinction between the two pertains to constraints on their distribution. Thus, the adverbial *kaze* shows the distributional properties otherwise associated with what Quirk *et al*. (1985) refer to as 'subjunct', namely, an adverbial which, like a disjunct, cannot be the focus of a cleft construction, an alternative interrogative, or a restricting subjunct like *only*. The modifying *kaze* is not barred from these environments. This is evident in the distinction between the well-formed sentences in (8) and (9), which display the modifying *kaze,* and the ill-formed sentences in (10) and (11), the relevant correlates of sentence (4), where the adverbial *kaze* occurs:[4]

(8) rak   **kaze** bayit ani muxan liknot [**bold** indicates accentuation]
      only such house I   ready   to buy
      'Only such a house I am ready to buy.' (I am ready to buy only such a house.)

(9) at   meunyenet besefer   **kaze**   o **kaze / axer** ?
      you (F.) interested   in a book like this or like this/different

'Are you interested in a book like this or like that/ or a different one ?'

(10) * bahatxala ze hevix oti rak kaze
  at the beginning it embarrassed me only sort of

(11) * bahatxala ze hevix otxa kaze o mamaS ?
  at the beginning it embarrassed you sort of or actually

   Semantically, the original adjectival *kaze* means 'like this', 'such', while the adverbial use under discussion acquired the meaning 'kind of', 'sort of', 'roughly speaking', 'approximately'. The designation of hedginess in the adverbial could be construed as a natural extension of its original adjectival sense. Thus, *kaze* 'like this' expresses similarity; being a relative, rather than an absolute concept (cf. Tversky and Gati 1978), similarity lends itself naturally to an interpretation of approximation.[5] In what follows I will only be concerned with the adverbial *kaze*. I will examine its properties in light of the distinction between conceptual and procedural meanings. It will be shown that this item displays properties associated with both.

3. Conceptual and procedural properties: Theoretical examination

3.1. Conceptual properties

Affecting truth-conditionality determination has been taken to be a property associated with entities that encode conceptual meaning.[6] An examination of the relevant properties of the adverbial *kaze* (as in the examples in (4)-(7) above) reveals that the content added by this hedge to the sentence is, clearly, truth-conditionally relevant. The propositional content of the sentence in question is undoubtedly affected by the hedging effect of the adverbial under consideration. In the following:

(12) ..Soxev al haarec uvoxe kaze (*taatuon* p. 38)
  lying on the ground and crying like

(13) loxacim   yadayim kaze (*taatuon* p. 39)
  pressing (shaking) hands like

the description of the person as crying (in (12)) or the characterization of the state-of-affairs as an instance of hand-shaking (in (13)) are easily challengeable: this is not what is normally described as crying and it was no handshake, respectively. Likewise, it is evident that the use of *kaze* does not require that the entities which it modifies be scalar, and thus simply lower their position on the relevant scale. Rather, it appears that this type of hedged description serves an important communicative need, namely, the speaker's option not to have to commit herself to any definite,

precise characterization, if she so wishes. In relevance theoretic terms, this effect may be achieved by the use of *kaze* as an explicit indication of lack of speaker commitment or as marking the relevant content as an instance of loose use.[7]

        This semantic characterization as an approximation predicts the ill-formedness of such sentences as:

> (14) exad veod exad hem Snayim (* kaze)
>   one   plus   one   are   two   (sort of)

The hedgy *kaze* cannot co-occur with well-known, non-controversial truths. It seems that there is no relevant sense in which the speaker could be hedging in such cases, under normal assumptions. Not surprisingly, Matsumoto (1985) noted that the Japanese counterpart of (14), with *chotto* 'little' as the lexical hedge, is just as infelicitous. However, in a later contribution (Matsumoto 1990) she points out an interesting context where such sentences may become felicitous. This is the case where the speaker is correcting the addressee's mistake in the addition operation and is attempting to mitigate the effect of her utterance by presenting it in a "softened", apologetic manner, akin to 'if I may say so'. Note, that here it is not the propositional content that is being modified but, rather, the speech act itself. A similar communicative effect will be shown to be available for *kaze* in Hebrew. Summing up, then, in this section *kaze* has been shown to affect truth conditionality determination when used as a hedge. This property has been associated with entities encoding conceptual meanings.

3.2.   Procedural properties

Procedural meaning was taken to constitute information which acts as a set of instructions on how to process conceptual representations and to be functional in constraining or directing the inferential processes involved in interpretation. As such, it was characterized as prototypically not affecting truth conditionality determination, not contributing to the propositional content, relating to the speech situation, and displaying emotive but no referential / denotative function (cf. Jucker 1993). In this section it will be shown that *kaze* displays certain procedural properties. Before I present evidence of it being functional in the modification of speech acts, evidence which cannot in itself be taken to be compelling, in view of such conceptual entities as *frankly* fulfilling similar speech act modification functions (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1993), I will quote evidence indicating that *kaze* differs from conceptual entities with similar semantic content conveying approximation and hedginess.

        I have already mentioned (in section 2 above) that adverbial *kaze* displays the distributional properties associated with so-called subjuncts, that is, it cannot be the focus of a cleft construction, an alternative interrogative, or a restricting subjunct like *only*. This is evident in (10) and (11), repeated here for convenience:

(10) * bahatxala   ze hevix   oti   rak kaze

at the beginning it embarrassed me   only sort of

(11) * bahatxala   ze hevix   otxa kaze   o mamaS ?
        at the beginning it embarrassed you sort of or actually

Comparing these restrictions on *kaze* with the relevant distributional properties of conceptual
entities encoding similar semantic content expressing approximation and hedginess e.g. *keilu* ('as
if', 'sort of') and *beerex* ('approximately'), it becomes evident that they do occur in these
environments, as in:

(15) bahatxala   ze rak   keilu   hevix   oti   (lo   mamaS)
      at the beginning it   only apparently embarrassed   me   (not   really)

(16) hu   kara SloSim sfarim beerex   o   bediyuk ?
       he   read thirty   books approximately   or exactly

This distributional asymmetry between the relevant lexical means expressing hedginess indicates
that *kaze* displays properties which distinguish it from the corresponding conceptual entities.
The inability to become salient by the relevant focus establishing devices suggests that it
functions on a plane other than the propositional content. This feature has been identified as
characterizing procedural meaning.
        Evidence corroborating this characterization may come from the distinction mentioned
above (section 2) between the modifying *kaze* and its adverbial correlate with regard to their
occurrence as the focus in the relevant domains. Unlike the adverbial counterpart, the modifying
kaze does occur as the focus of the restricting *rak* ('only') and in alternative interrogatives as in
(8) and (9) above (repeated here for convenience):

(8) rak   **kaze** bayit ani muxan liknot [**bold** indicates accentuation]
      only such house I   ready to buy
      'Only such a house I am ready to buy.' (I am ready to buy only such a house.)

(9) at   meunyenet besefer   **kaze**   o **kaze / axer** ?
      you (F.) interested   in a book like this or like this/different
      'Are you interested in a book like this or like that/ or a different one ?'

The modifying *kaze* shares the distributional properties attributed to conceptual entities and in
this respect differs systematically from its adverbial correlate.
        As we have seen in the case of its Japanese counterpart *chotto*, in addition to its semantic
"hedginess", a clearly truth functional aspect of meaning, *kaze* is functional in the modification of
speech acts as well. Despite the existence of conceptual entities which show similar speech-act -
modification functions (e.g. sentential adverbials like *frankly*), this feature was identified as a

characteristically procedural attribute of interpretation. The occurrence of *kaze* in sentences such as :

(17) at   muxana kaze laazor li ?
      you ready sort of to help me

is to be accounted for in terms other than the speaker's commitment to the truth or lack thereof of the propositional content of the sentence. Such sentences function as requests and any account based on their truth would, of course, be inapplicable, in principle. Rather, the occurrence of *kaze* in such cases is to be explained in terms of their illocutionary force. *kaze* can occur in sentences expressing requests as an indicator of the speaker's lack of commitment to the appropriateness of the request. The request could be judged inappropriate in terms of politeness, for example. The speaker could be assumed to have taken the liberty of requesting something she should normally not have asked for, potentially from someone who it is presumptuous of her to assume would comply with her request. The same is true in the case of questions, where the appropriateness status of the question at hand may call for a softener. Thus, if the question under consideration is in some sense in violation of normal assumptions about appropriateness in a given context, then the subjunct *kaze* would indicate tentativeness, which would function as a mitigating device.[8]
        This characterization of the procedural function of *kaze* makes certain predictions with respect to its distribution:
(a) *kaze* can occur in sentences conveying questions only if these count as impositions; sincere questions which do not seem to cause any embarrassment disallow *kaze* in their domain.
(b) modifying the speech act, *kaze* does not co-occur with orders.
These predictions are borne out, as is evident from the judgments of the following:

(18) * eize   yom hayom kaze ?
        which   day today
        'What day is today sort of?'

(19) at yexola kaze lehagid li lama lo   bat ?
       you can   to tell me why   not came (2F)
     'Can you tell me *kaze* why you did not come ?

In (19) the speaker is making explicit her awareness of the potential embarrassment in her question; no such embarrassment or inappropriateness is likely in (18), which constitutes a genuine request for information of a non-emotive type. Admittedly, in a trivial sense, any request for information constitutes an imposition, and could thus be accompanied by some explicit indication of "appropriateness establishing" device. However, there are clearly social conventions differentiating ranks on the relevant impositional / embarrassing scales which seem to call for the potential co-occurrence of the linguistic mitigating devices in question. Seeking information about the date (as in (18)) does not constitute such an imposition or embarrassment in Israeli

society. Like the ill-formedness of (18), the ill-formedness of (20) (following) too is predicted by the above characterization of the procedural features of *kaze*:

(20) * Sev   beSeket kaze
      sit   quietly sort of

The decisive nature of orders (evident here formally too by the use of the imperative) is incompatible with the tentativity indicated by *kaze*, where it modifies and mitigates the particular illocutionary force.

      In this section I have sketched the features associated with the so-called subjunct *kaze* which align it with entities displaying procedural properties. These were its non-contribution to the propositional content, speech-act modification and in certain domains lack of effect on truth conditionality determination. In what follows I will discuss the practical and theoretical implications of the convergence of conceptual and procedural properties on the Hebrew subjunct *kaze*.

4.   **Polyfunctionality and polysemy**

The evidence provided so far for the co-occurrence of procedural and conceptual features in the use of the Hebrew subjunct *kaze* raises the question whether this state-of-affairs is indicative of the existence of two distinct subjuncts *kaze*, each displaying different semantic properties, or whether there is a common denominator, indicating there is a unique subjunct *kaze*, the relevant properties of which being predictable on the basis of scope. It will be argued that analyzing the facts just uncovered in terms of polysemy misses a generalization that the common denominator approach makes transparent. This analysis is much in the spirit of Mastumoto (1990) and Jucker (1993), who attribute a single meaning to or a uniform basis for the different instantiations or apparent polyfunctionality of Japanese *chotto* and English *well,* respectively.

      The common denominator in the use of *kaze*, accordingly, would be an overt indication of the speaker's lack of commitment to the accuracy of the relevant description in or whole propositional content of the sentence in question or to the appropriateness of some aspect of the illocutionary force of the utterance under consideration. The over-all effect then is one of absolving the speaker of the responsibility for the absolute truth, accuracy or appropriateness of her statement. Mirror-image-wise, from the point of view of the hearer, the occurrence of *kaze* signals the relevant variety of lack of commitment on the part of the speaker. It is interesting to mention in this context Jucker's (1993) reservation about the function of *well* in introducing direct quotes. Jucker cites an instance where *well* occurs in a direct quote as an approximator, roughly:

(21) X said something like [quote]

and suggests that it is improbable that a direct quote without *well* is more accurate than a quote with it. However, if *well* in those quotes is regarded as fulfilling a discourse function similar to *kaze* as just described, then it should not be that improbable, after all.

      Assigning a unique function to the subjunct *kaze*, indicating lack of speaker commitment or marking certain material as an instance of loose use, makes certain predictions with respect to particular instantiations, namely, that they might differ in scope. This prediction is indeed borne out as is evident in the following example from *taatuon* (p.34):

(22) and Eztion turned to him kaze [muxan lehakot] kaze
                                 ready   to hit

There is no sense of redundancy in the use of *kaze* in this example. One of its instances (either the first or the second) has *muxan lehakot* 'ready to hit' in its domain and has a hedging function, the other one has an effect at the illocutionary force level and proposes a tentative characterization. Note that structurally both the first and the second occurrences of *kaze* may have similar domains. In addition, there are instances where the distinct scopes of *kaze* may give rise to an ambiguity. Witness:

(23)   at   yexola kaze lavo ?
     you (F) can   KAZE to come
     'Could you KAZE come?'

(23) may be interpreted in the hedgy sense, where *kaze* would have *lavo* 'to come' in its scope, and would thus mean something roughly like: 'kind of come' amounting to : 'Can you sort of come/ drop in?' Or, it may be interpreted procedurally, where the whole speech act would be in its scope, amounting to something like: 'Is it OK if I ask you whether you can come ?' Interestingly, the two interpretations show some similarity in mitigational effect. The procedural interpretation is explicitly associated with a mitigating function (see 3.2 above), but the hedgy, conceptual sense seems to amount to a softening of the request, as well. Apparently, dropping in is not perceived of as imposing as coming, and so the request to drop in is meant to be taken as belittling the request and to be construed as a mitigation. It thus turns out that both the conceptual and the procedural interpretations contribute equally to the effect of mitigation in this case. (Incidentally, the same type of ambiguity is evident in the case of Japanese *chotto* (cf. Matsumoto 1985.))

      It is instructive in this context to consider instances where *kaze* occurs in reported speech and see what its scope of applicability is. A relevant example is provided in (24):

(24) Dani Sa'al   im ani yexola kaze   lavo.
     Danny asked if I   can   KAZE to come
     'Danny asked if I could sort of come.'

kaze appears to be used in its hedgy, conceptual sense, in such cases, amounting to:

(25) Danny asked if I could kind of come/ drop in.

Not surprisingly, no interpretation is available in this context where it functions procedurally. As in the case of disjuncts like *briefly*, which would not modify the speech act once they occur in an embedded clause, so too (24) is not interpreted as in:

(26) Danny asked if it is OK whether he asks me if I can come.

The relevant question in the case of the conceptual interpretation is whether the hedgy effect is Danny's or the reporter's, namely, whether it is a de dicto or a de re use. It appears that in such cases in the non-ironic use *kaze* conveys the reporter's dictum, the de re use, whether or not the original phraseology contained this lexical item.[9]
        A proposal could be made that in fact *kaze* only has a conceptual sense of an approximator and that the procedural interpretation is an artifact of the mitigating effect achieved by the approximation evident in the lexical hedge.[10] This position would be very interesting with respect to the theoretical question concerning the relationship between conceptual and procedural senses; however, it could be counterexemplified by instances where *kaze* occurs unambiguously as a discourse marker pertaining to the speech act appropriateness without any potential hedgy reading which could generate it. Such an example is provided in sentence (27) (following), which was uttered by an embarrassed student (A.W.) trying to ask me for what she considered to be too much to ask, an extension on a paper which had been long overdue. Note the hesitant opening of her request, where *kaze* does not have any specific lexical material that could be within its scope, but rather signals the tentativity, or indecisive nature of the future request.

(27) at kaze,   ulay,   tov lo xaSuv   ...raciti   levakeS maSehu
     you KAZE   maybe well not important I wanted to ask   something
     'You sort of, maybe, OK doesn't matter..I wanted to ask for something'

In this example *kaze* is used along with additional explicit indicators of the potential inappropriateness of the request. Likewise, consider the occurrence of *kaze* utterance finally, often in the form of an afterthought[11] as in example (28):

(28) ata   yaxol lehalvot li   et   haet   Selxa | kaze ? [| = slight pause]
      you   can   to lend me ACC the pen your   kaze
     'Could you lend me your pen   KAZE ?' .

where the speaker indicates her realization (in mid-stream) that the addressee might consider the request impertinent. Here, too, as in (27), there is no special sentential constituent which might be modified by the use of *kaze* as a hedge, but rather the directive speech act itself is modified. The occurrence of *kaze* in contexts such as (27) and (28) seems to argue against the suggestion that *kaze* only has a conceptual meaning in Hebrew. In fact, it is my contention that the state-of-

affairs is the following: there is just one subjunct use of *kaze* and it is an instance of a procedural entity. The function of this procedural entity is the indication of a rough approximation or an instruction to take the material within its scope as an instance of loose use (in the relevance theoretic sense). Thus, used procedurally, *kaze* constrains the interpretation of the utterance to the effect that a particular constituent of the proposition expressed is to be understood loosely . When the material in question is truth functionally relevant this clearly affects truth conditionality, and thus shows properties otherwise associated with conceptual meaning, when, however, the whole speech act is in its scope then, predictably, it has no truth conditional effect and shows features normatively associated with procedural meaning.

In evaluating the data it becomes evident that the considerations as to the polysemy issue are affected by the range of predictions available by the uniform sense analysis (such as the predictability of certain distributional constraints and of potential ambiguities) and the principled account of the convergence across genetically unrelated languages of these functions on similar lexical items (cf. footnote 5).

5.   A Gricean Account

The analysis of the lexical item *kaze* poses an interesting challenge to the Gricean framework. On the one hand, the non-commitment or loose use with which it is associated appear like a conventional rather than a conversational aspect of its meaning. On the other hand, using *kaze* speakers do not abide by the Quality, Quantity, and potentially even the Manner maxim explicitly and, sometimes, even deliberately so, and, following Grice, these violations ought to generate conversational implicatures. Specifically, *kaze* signaling lack of accuracy or truth, stands in blatant violation of the Quality maxim. The Quantity maxim appears to be deviated when speakers do not provide the amount of information requested, but rather, using *kaze*, indicate that they do not wish to specify or elaborate. The Manner maxim with its submaxim requiring that no "obscurity of expression" be introduced, seems to be violated as well, since *kaze* licenses "obscure" characterizations. In the face of these violations, the lack of any proper conversational implicature is inexplicable and constitutes a problem for the Gricean approach.[12] A revised conception whereby explicitly stated violations of the maxims do not generate conversational implicatures is a theoretical option worth investigating.

Kasher's (1976,1982, 1987a and 1987b) alternative to the Gricean Cooperative Principle derives the various maxims from an overall Rationality Principle which is a socially anchored economy principle. Speakers (and by extension hearers too) are assumed to follow rational (and presumably intentional) principles of behavior which are economically sound in terms of cost and benefit and which presumably guide them in both speech production and interpretation. In the case at hand, invoking the Rationality Principle would not result in the redundancy or open-endedness evident in the instances where the proper Gricean maxim is sought, since there is obviously just one governing principle. Yet, if Kasher's Rationality Principle operates under the original Gricean assumptions with respect to implicatures, then it too would seem to be unable to

provide an account for the non-generation of conversational implicatures when the Rationality Principle is apparently violated (in its Quality, Quantity or Manner correlates). However, the Rationality conception with its emphasis on economy considerations could offer an alternative perspective on the apparent violation of maxims. Thus the non-commitment evident in the use of *kaze* which stands in violation of the Quantity maxim, for example, could count as exemplifying Rationality after all, under the sound assumption that violations of the informativity requirement embodied in the Quantity maxim are less costly in social terms than are corresponding violations of truth and accountability, in the relevant social environment. And indeed, the extensive use of lexical hedges like *kaze* seems to corroborate the suggestion that we do in fact consider violations of truth and unsubstantiated statements worse socially than corresponding violations of full-fledged informativity. It is thus not the violation of the maxim of Quantity per se that we should focus on, in such contexts, rather the fact that using *kaze* speakers signal that they are only as informative as the conditions at hand call for, without making any "irrational" social moves (thus violating the Rationality Principle). A similar rationale could be applied to apparent violations of the Quality and Manner maxims.[13] The Rationality Principle thus appears to be able to explain the use of *kaze* more consistently and more coherently than the original Gricean framework,[14] yet the problematicity evident in the assignment of a conversational, rather than a conventional status to the meaning of *kaze* by either version suggests that we should try an alternative approach with the required properties. Incidentally, in the Retrospective Epilogue to his 1989 book, Grice comes closer to the perception of relevance theorists on this issue by recognizing some conventional aspect of the meaning of discourse markers and by establishing a distinction between lower and higher level speech acts. Accordingly, the discourse markers presumably function on the higher level "commenting" on the lower level.[15]

6.   Relevance Theory

Throughout the presentation I was presupposing Blakemore's (1987) distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning couched within Sperber and Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory. Briefly, Relevance Theory stipulates that human understanding is biologically guided by relevance considerations of which humans need not be aware and which govern inferential processes. Relevance is characterized as a relative term increasing with the number of positive contextual effects per cognitive effort. It has been suggested that since it allows exclusively cognitive factors in the determination of informativity, Relevance Theory is insufficient in cases where social considerations such as politeness are concerned; it would necessarily attribute an improbable cognitive content to otherwise purely social, interactional factors. The use of *kaze* as a mitigating device is just such an example. It appears that no exclusively cognitively-oriented approach, such as the presumption of relevance, can account for the politeness effect resulting from the expression of lack of commitment with respect to the appropriateness of a given utterance. The augmentation of the inferential processes in instances of explicatures (explicitly communicated assumptions) and the conceptual / procedural meaning distinction by a principled

interaction of these with assumptions about social conventions seem to provide the theoretical background required in the case at hand (cf. Ziv 1988b).

In an attempt to account for *well* as a discourse marker within Relevance Theory, Jucker (1993) suggests that *well* constitutes an instruction on how to process the information, or, more specifically, an instruction to reconstruct a background against which the addressee can process the upcoming utterance. *well*, then, signals that what seems to be the most relevant context is not appropriate. In the same spirit, and in line with the proposals in Wilson and Sperber (1993), an analysis of the procedural interpretation of *kaze* would involve regarding it as an explicit indicator on how to process the speech act in its scope. Roughly something like: the speaker acknowledges that the available context (such as shared knowledge) does not merit the presumption evident in the request and wishes to extend it, so that the request is interpreted appropriately. This explicit indication is done via a marker of imprecision, inappropriateness, tentativity. We have seen (section 2) that once this marker has lexical material in its scope it affects truth conditionality.

This characterization of the lexical marker *kaze* offers interesting theoretical implications with respect to the characterization of procedural and conceptual meanings. Specifically, the original assumptions attributing non-truth conditionality effects to procedural meaning are challenged. In fact, Wilson and Sperber (1993) have already raised the option that procedural meaning may be associated with truth conditionality determination, but the evidence they quote in support of this position is not as convincing. Their analysis of personal pronouns as instances of procedural entities which do affect truth conditionality is challengeable in ways that I will not elaborate on here. Instead, however, their theoretical stand seems to be exemplified more convincingly by such examples as the Hebrew discourse marker *kaze*. The analysis of this discourse marker presented in the current paper attributes procedural meaning characteristics to it, while at the same time demonstrating its effect on truth conditionality determination. In addition to this contribution to the full-characterization of items conveying procedural meaning, the description of the properties of the Hebrew discourse marker *kaze* constitutes a step towards a more thorough understanding of the category of discourse markers cross linguistically.

7. Conclusion

I have argued that Modern Hebrew *kaze* provides an interesting case of a lexical hedge and a discourse marker in one and that as such, it challenges some of the characterizations of discourse markers on the one hand and of entities conveying procedural meaning, on the other. Relevance theory augmented by some version of the distinction between procedural and conceptual senses has been argued to provide the most insightful framework for its analysis. Questions concerning the wider applicability of such characterizations await further research.

Notes

[1] I would like to thank Villy Rouchota and my co-editor, Andreas Jucker, for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

[2] In fact, Wilson and Sperber (1993) have already challenged this dichotomy . However, their thesis seems to be supported more strongly by the current analysis of the discourse marker *kaze* than by their own example of personal pronouns.

[3] In Ziv 1988a certain properties of *kaze* were sketched in the context of specifying the metalinguistic awareness evident in some of its uses. The theoretical concerns and conclusions were distinct from the ones evident in the current context. In particular, the issues pertaining to the conceptual and procedural distinction were not touched upon.

[4] I will not quote evidence on the basis of Cleft constructions here, since the colloquial variety is perceived of as an "Englishism" and the more literary variety is severely register restricted and does not co-occur comfortably with the hediness markers examined here. .

[5] It is thus not surprising to find parallel developments in several unrelated languages, such as American English *like*, Serbo Croatian *kao,* Japanese *chotto* and Norwegian *lissom*. In fact, the last two hedges evolved from the corresponding lexical item meaning 'little'. Here too the potential for hedginess is transparent via the route of 'not quite'. This view obviously presupposes what could be referred to as a diachronic development; a view that is expressed elsewhere in this book, e.g. in Shloush's treatment of Hebrew *bekicur* ('in short') and which is discussed in great detail in Ariel. As for an account of the workings of hedginess, it appears that some version of fuzzy logic of the type proposed by Lakoff (1972) in conjunction with the relevance theoretic conception of "loose use" may have to be adopted.

[6] This does not necessarily imply that all entities that encode concepts need affect truth conditionality, as is evident, for example, in Wilson and Sperber's (1993) discussion of conceptual items like *frankly* when affecting the higher level explicature and in the treatment of so-called parenthetical discourse markers in Rouchota (in this volume).

[7] Incidentally, Andersen's characterization of English *like* (in this volume) displays very similar characteristics. Also, see Itani (1995) for a discussion of the truth-conditional status of hedges within relevance theory.

[8] It is interesting to note in this context that such uses of *kaze* are mostly associated with the speech of youngsters. Teachers and educators have been preaching against what they consider to be the degraded nature of language and the evident lack of desire on the part of the users of *kaze* to make any commitments. These features are then further characterized as revealing low moral and social standards. Similar attitudes have been detected with respect to the use of discourse markers in other languages

[9] As is well-known, the original phrasing may, but need not, be preserved in reporting. Such lexical hedges as *kaze* provide an interesting instance where quoting the expression used by the original speaker (the de dicto reading) may be associated with irony on the part of the reporter. It could be that she does not agree with the mitigation implied by the use of *kaze* in such cases; to her, dropping in is just as impositional as coming. It could also be the case that the reporter does

not regard herself as part of the same language register as that which utilizes the lexical hedge *kaze* and this quote on her part has a dissociative function, via the ironic use

[10] This proposal was made to me by R. Landau.

[11] For some characterization of afterthoughts (in the context of right dislocation) see Ziv and Grosz (1994).

[12] Note the elasticity of the Gricean maxims and the lack of clear criteria determining when each is relevant. Grice himself admits (1989: 368-372) that this is the state of affairs. It is important to point out in the current context that this lack of predictability is clearly counter-productive for any attempt to establish pragmatics as part of an overall account of our linguistic capacity. It should also be noted that attempting to apply neo-Gricean frameworks of the Horn- Levinson variety toward the problem at hand does not fare better than the original. Thus, it seems that utilizing Horn's (1985) speaker's R(elevance) - principle (of least effort) buys us more than the hearer's Q(uantity) principle, even though, strictly speaking, Relevance does not seem to be involved in its characterization, while Quantity (a` la Grice) does. Levinson's (1987) version of these maxims with its I(nformativeness) principle, particularly its speaker oriented Minimization maxim, seems to be able to handle the speaker's perspective of the truth conditional aspect of the use of *kaze*, but neither the correlating hearer's augmentation nor the speech act appropriateness utilization of *kaze* seem to be accountable by this principle.

[13] Kasher's (1988) rebuttal of Keenan-Ochs' (1976) claim that the Gricean Cooperative Principle is not universal displays the same line of argumentation. The apparent counterexamples to the CP in Madagascar society are treated as economically sound choices, such that the lack of cooperativity is the rational option in an environment where making commitments and divulging information are extremely costly socially.

[14] Incidentally, in the Retrospective Epilogue to his 1989 book, Grice explains that following the Cooperative Principle is an instance of rational activity, essentially adopting Kasher's view. In this context see also Ziv (1988b) where I sketch Kasher's Rationality framework vis αvis Sperber and Wilson's Relevance theory as alternatives to the Gricean Cooperative Principle.

[15] Cf. Wilson and Sperber's (1993) view on the similarities and differences between Relevance Theory and the revised Gricean view on this issue.

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