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Modernity, Cultural Anesthesia, and Sensory Agency: Technologies of the Listening Self in a US Collegiate Jazz Music Program

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ABSTRACT In this article, I rely on Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of the self’ to theorize the micro-practices by which individuals actively negotiate the reconfiguration of their sensory skills as a result of modernization processes. In doing so, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork I conducted in a collegiate jazz music program in the USA. By exploring a number of interactional games in which jazz students attempt to negotiate the challenge of cultivating aural skills in a pedagogical context that embraces visually mediated modes of knowledge production and transmission as a result of the professionalization and rationalization of jazz training, I inquire into the conditions of possibility for sensory agency under modernity.

KEYWORDS Sensory agency, modernization, technologies of the self; improvisation, USA

‘What did you Whistle?’: Recalibrating the Ears

One cold February night, I was walking down the street with Sarah, a vibraphone student in her mid twenties. As we were walking, someone sitting in a parked car next to us suddenly honked twice. Immediately, in complete synchrony with one another, Sarah and I whistled in an attempt to imitate the exact pitch of the car horn. However, each of us whistled a different pitch. At first I did not give it a second thought and intended to continue on my way but Sarah abruptly stood still. She turned to me and asked: ‘What did you whistle?’ I whistled again, repeating the exact pitch that I had whistled a second before. Sarah then repeated her whistle. Mine was a few steps below hers. Sarah looked at me for a second and then said in a flat voice: ‘Go and ask them to honk again’. At first I thought she was joking.
It was an extremely cold night and I was eager to be indoors. I looked at the car. The engine was running and I could see three people sitting inside. I looked again at Sarah and realized that she was serious and was not going to take no for an answer. Reluctantly, I walked to the car and knocked on the window. The two men in the front seats and the woman in the back seat looked at me. The driver had a cell-phone in his hand and was apparently calling someone to come down to the car. The window rolled down. ‘Can you please honk again?’ I asked, hesitantly. ‘You see’, I continued, trying to figure out what to say, ‘we had a bet’. I did not explain any further. As I said these words I pointed with my head toward Sarah who watched me all this time. The passengers looked at me with dismay. After a minute of silence, in which I remained standing, the driver, almost hastily, honked the horn again and rolled up the window. ‘Thanks’, I managed to say before the window was completely sealed again. I turned around to face Sarah who was standing motionless, an almost unperceivable smile on her lips. She said: ‘Let’s go?’

This interaction illustrates well some of the features of the kind of reflexive cultural work on the senses that has become increasingly prevalent among the students I worked with during my fieldwork in two academic jazz music programs in the USA, Commonwealth, and Midtown. To begin, notice the topic or concern of this interaction. The competitive element that seems to structure it is secondary in its importance. Sarah’s and my initial reactions to hearing the car horn were synchronous with one another. It was only after realizing that the other person whistled as well and, more importantly, that there was discrepancy between our reactions to the pitch of the car horn that the definition of the situation changed into that of a competition or a game. Thus, the attempt to match the car-horn by whistling was our primary concern. As I argue below, it was motivated by the desire to retrain one’s ears against the backdrop of a cultural context that is pervaded by fears about the decline of the ability to ‘listen’.

However, while the competitive aspect of the interaction in which Sarah and I participated is secondary, it is part of what makes this and the other interaction I will later discuss effective as training ground for the formation of a specific self. Consider again this interaction. A random sound is heard. Once the participants discern a discrepancy in their reactions to this sound, a heightened collective focus on and exploration of the various dimensions of the culturally valued skill of ‘listening’ emerge not only because of the focused attention that, as Ervin Goffman argued, is characteristic to games as structures that frame and bracket chunks of reality (Goffman 1961). Rather, I will suggest that the agonistic nature of this framework motivates students to enact elaborate verification
processes whose purpose is to discern the ‘truth’, as well as to come up with and debate the procedures that would ensure a ‘fair game’. Thus, students learn to define what ‘listening’ is at the same time that they try to ascertain whether they master it. By putting themselves in situations where their performance authenticity thus understood is tested, they learn both about this experience as a culturally sanctioned norm and to aim for it.

Lastly, this agonistic framework allows students to collectively recalibrate their ears in unexpected times and places and in ways that cut across the prescribed and regimented learning processes of the school that, as I will suggest, focus on visually mediated modes of learning. In its obliviousness to space and time, this genred interaction allows students to incorporate sonic stimuli from everyday life into the practice of cultivating their listening skills. In the previous vignette, everyday life is incorporated in the form of a car horn. In other examples that I witnessed, the ringing of a cell phone, the sound of an airplane passing in the sky, and other external auditory stimuli prompted similar competitive attempts between students to match the stimuli in singing or whistling. These attempts were often followed by elaborate verification processes of various sorts. Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this type of interaction that I have witnessed took place at Midtown School while a number of students waited for the teacher to arrive to class. At one point, the sound of an ambulance siren infiltrated into the classroom from the busy street below. Immediately, three students attempted to top one another in their imitations of the siren by whistling and singing, paying close attention to who was the first to successfully represent the pitch.

In this article, I seek to contribute to the long tradition of anthropological research on the relationship between modernization processes and the modality of the sensuous through an analysis of these game-like interactions. This tradition of research has found expression in a edited volume on ‘Perception and Memory as Material Culture in Modernity’ (Seremetakis 1994). Discussing the disappearance of a specific type of peach from her native country of Greece due to the European Economic Community (EEC) regulations – a peach whose taste suffuses her childhood memories – Nadia Seremetakis provides an interesting take on modernity, historical change, and experience. She asks ‘What elements in a culture enable the sensory experience of history?’ (Seremetakis 1994:3), and adds the following words:

The erasure of one Greek peach poses the question: at what experiential levels are the economic and social transformations of the EEC being felt? . . . In Greece, as regional
products gradually disappear, they are replaced by foreign goods, foreign tastes; the
universal and rationalized is now imported into the European periphery as the exotic.
Here a regional diversity is substituted by a surplus over-production. The EEC project
implicitly constitutes a massive resocialization of existing consumer cultures and sen-
sibililities, as well as a reorganization of public memory . . . Sensory premises, mem-
ories and histories are being pulled out from under entire regional cultures and the
capacity to reproduce social identities may be altered as a result. Such economic pro-
cesses reveal the extent to which the ability to replicate cultural identity is a material
practice embedded in the reciprocities, aesthetics, and sensory strata of material
objects. (Seremetakis 1994:3)

Seremetakis, as the other contributors to her edited volume, writes about differ-
ent expressions of ‘cultural anesthesia’, i.e. ‘the effacement of sensory memory in
modernity . . . mainly [as] a consequence of an extreme division of labor, per-
ceptual specialization and rationalization’ (Seremetakis 1994:9–10). Her analysis
can be securely placed within a long sociological and anthropological tradition
that has been concerned with theorizing the experiential implications of various
processes identified with modernity such as increased rationalization, professio-
nalization, and commodification. Indeed, a number of key social theorists have
argued that modernity is tightly coupled with the reconfiguration of individuals’
sensory agency. Most often, they have conceptualized this reconfiguration in
terms of the standardization and dilution of experience. For example, Karl
Marx associated the rise of capitalism and private property with the estrange-
ment and alienation of the individual’s species-being and ‘human relations to
the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling’, which can only be eman-
cipated again by ‘the transcendence of private property’ (Marx 1978:87). Georg
Simmel theorized the psychological implications of the rise of the ‘money
economy’ in terms of the blasé disposition of the urban dweller, arguing that
money ‘becomes the frightful leveler – it hollows out the core of things, their
particularities, their specific values and their uniqueness and incomparability
in a way which is beyond repair’ (Simmel 1972:330). Significantly, Simmel
characterized this process as the ‘de-coloring of things’, in which things
appear to the individual ‘in a homogenous, flat and gray color’ (Simmel 1972).
In the same way, Adorno (1982) argued that consumers of standardized
musical content broadcast on the airwaves become ‘regressive listeners’, i.e. indi-
viduals whose senses and faculties of judgment have been so numbed by such
trite content that they cannot perceive anything else anymore and come to
expect this content. Finally, Walter Benjamin theorized the decline of the prac-
tice of story-telling and its replacement with standardized and commodified
information given in newspapers in terms of the disappearance of a type of experience embedded in individuals’ richly sensuous lifeworlds (Benjamin 1969a).

As William Mazzarella has argued, these theories are different versions of the notion that Western modernity ‘was, above all, a matter of the diffusion of universalizing processes and categories’, a notion that was first systematized by Hegel’s idea of history as the teleological self-realization of Spirit. Indeed, for Hegel, history constituted a process characterized by ‘the possession and penetration of the concrete and particular by the abstract and general’ (Mazzarella 2004:39–40) and hence, by implication, the abstraction and dilution of sensuous experience. This philosophical tradition, as well as the notion of disengaged reason that many of the key figures in anthropology took for granted as structuring Western notions of the self, have informed anthropological theory’s general neglect to provide more sophisticated accounts of the relation between Western modernity and the senses that avoid such totalizing narratives (for a critique of this neglect, see Stoller 1989; Erlmann 2004; Hirschkind 2006:29; Howes 2006). Thorough ethnographies of the role of the senses in culture have been more likely to focus on non-Western contexts (Feld 1982).

Recently, however, anthropologists have shifted their ethnographic lens to explore how individuals make and remake identities, traditions, and places through cultural work that involves the senses in response to Western modernity’s presumed erosion of cultural and sensory difference. Much of this recent anthropological work has focused on the production of sensuous objects, e.g., comestibles such as cheese, wine, and olive oil that index certain identities and places via their distinctive and particular taste or sensuousness, which is meant to resist the presumed standardization and leveling of the sensuous brought about by global processes of rationalization of production (Vizcarra Bordi 2006; Heath & Meneley 2007; Meneley 2007; Paolisso 2007; Paxson 2010). Yet the strategies individuals devise to negotiate the implications of modernization processes on their skills and capacities to perceive certain sensory qualities have not received similar scholarly attention. Although it is clear that, for example, the production of comestibles that index certain identities and places via their distinctive and particular taste or sensuousness also entails the training of the senses to perceive this distinctive sensuousness, scholars have tended not to study such training in itself but only as an epiphenomenon of the production of distinctively sensuous objects.

In this article I focus on this aspect of the problematic, i.e. the ways in which individuals take up the challenge of sensory self-fashioning in view of
modernization processes. I do so by discussing the micro-practices by which some of the students I worked with respond to a crisis that concerns their sensory skills and that implicates their capacity to produce improvisations that are considered to be appropriate according to well-defined, culturally-specific criteria. According to the educators I worked with, the professionalization of jazz training, of which Commonwealth and Midtown are an expression, has resulted in the increased visual mediation of jazz knowledge, particularly via the production, dissemination, and extensive use of printed textual-artifacts of various sorts as pedagogical aids. This shift has compromised their students’ mastery of aural skills crucial to develop competence in jazz improvisation. Consequently, they tend to play musical patterns that they have incorporated into their bodies via method books instead of playing intentionality or editorially in the real-time of group improvisation by listening and reacting to the playing of their band members. The result is the production of standardized and monotonous music. At stake, then, are the sensuous implications of a very specific form of the professionalization and rationalization – indeed, the modernization – of jazz training. In this case, jazz students themselves, in addition to the music they produce, are the standardized products of modernization processes.

My purpose in this paper is twofold. First, by focusing on the strategies developed by the students I worked with to negotiate these implications, in which they tested each other’s ability to ‘use one’s ears’ in various ways and also provided one another with the training ground needed to develop this skill, I contribute to recent anthropological studies that have been concerned with the ways in which individuals negotiate modernity’s sensory manifestations. To return to Seremetakis’s account, I argue that if anesthesia is generally understood as a temporary and reversible lack of sensation in the clinical sense, then anthropologists need to theorize the conditions under which cultural anesthesia might be reversed in modern contexts that are characterized by increased rationalization, not only in terms of the production of distinctly sensuous objects but also in terms of the re-socialization of sensing subjects.

Second, in theorizing the ways in which individuals are able to be agentive vis-à-vis modernity’s sensory manifestations by training their senses according to culturally specific criteria, I use Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1997: 297), i.e. the strategies and techniques by which individuals constitute themselves according to publicly circulating discourses and regimes of truth. In doing so, I contribute to Foucault’s notion of technologies of the self by asking, what would technologies of the self that concern a self,
defined in aural terms, look like? What kind of technologies would individuals come up with in order to fashion such a self?

Before answering these questions it is necessary to elaborate on the specific context from which and as a response to which what I call ‘technologies of the listening self’ have emerged among the jazz students I worked with.

The Professionalization of Jazz Training and the Decline of ‘Listening’

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, jazz was only marginally present in American institutions of higher music education as a result of its association with African-American communities and its framing as a lesser form of music in comparison to Western classical music (Ogren 1989; Nettl 1995; Ake 2002). In this context, musicians learned to improvise primarily through emulation in the sites in which the music was performed or, with the dissemination of recording technology, by listening to previously recorded music (Peretti 1992; Berliner 1994; Wilkinson 1994; DeVeaux 1997). As a result of various factors such as the G.I. Bill, instituted after World War II to allow veterans to pursue degrees in higher education (McDaniel 1993); the Civil Rights Movement, which increased the cultural legitimacy of black music (Lopes 2002; Monson 2007); and jazz’s growing constituency among white middle-class Americans, more institutions of higher music education have integrated jazz into their curricula in one form or another (Prouty 2006). Against the backdrop of changes in the marketplace for jazz, which consisted of dwindling commercial demand and the disappearance of performance venues (Rosenthal 1992:170–73; Chevigny 2005:51–2), jazz programs have begun to play an increasingly important role in the cultural reproduction of jazz by providing both alternative sites of socialization and occupational opportunities for musicians as teachers (Ake 2002:112). Today there are hundreds of such programs in the USA alone, which grant different kinds of degrees in jazz performance. These programs offer professional training in the form of a rationalized curriculum that is implemented through newly devised teaching aids such as instruction booklets and audio and video material that have reconfigured the mode of the cultural reproduction of jazz. As I argue, the specific technologies of the self, devised by the students I worked with, emerged as a response to the new challenges generated by these shifts in the modes of jazz training.

At the time of my fieldwork, jazz educators expressed a growing sense of malaise that they often articulated in terms of a culturally specific ‘epistemological hierarchy’, i.e. a culturally specific ranking of modes of knowledge (Wilf 2010:372). They lamented the fact that as a result of the professionalization of
jazz and its increased rationalization, which entailed the codification of jazz knowledge in various textual artifacts such as pedagogical books, in addition to the disappearance of extra-curricular performing sites where this knowledge could be implemented in real-time performance, their students’ modes of learning the music have shifted from being primarily aurally mediated to being primarily visually mediated. Because of these shifts, so educators argued, their students do not inform their playing by listening but simply fall back on embodied practical mastery that is the result of visually mediated learning. They do not know how to use their ears in ways that would allow them to think editorially in the real-time of improvisation. This, in turn, has had significant repercussions. The improvisatory nature of jazz, i.e. its being an emergent entity that is the product of real-time improvisation and interaction between players, requires players to listen both to themselves so that they can create meaningful solos that exhibit poetic development and to the other band members so that the group can develop a groove (Monson 1996). Because they rely on embodied playing habits that they have acquired as a result of learning from printed method books rather than use their ears in the course of improvisation, students’ improvisations have become standardized and homogenized.

The jazz educators I worked with frequently articulated their awareness of an epistemological crisis in terms of a veritable cultural anesthesia. One educator summarized this crisis to his students in the following words:

You should try to learn these tunes as much as you can by ear. Try to learn something once a week, some kind of a tune. You should learn a melody, something. Force yourselves to memorize. Up here [points to his ears], not on paper. Because this was an ear music. You see, what’s happening is that when you come into school it becomes the other way around. It becomes this: your eyes teach your hand what to play and then finally your hands are teaching your ears. With these cats [the legendary players] it was the other way around. They heard the tune. They learned a lot of these tunes on the gig so their ears – it had to get into their ears before they could teach their fingers. That’s the way it went. So you want to try to get to that point where you can hear – get it in your ear and then let your ears teach it to your fingers rather than looking at that paper and, you know, keep repeating it. You dig?

The teacher describes a longitudinal shift in jazz players’ modes of learning jazz improvisation and in their sensory skills. Whereas prior to the academization of the music musicians acquired much of their knowledge by listening to the music in the venues in which it was performed or via listening to records, the students I worked with derive much of their knowledge from various
textual artifacts and they lack the extra-curricular performance sites in which they can implement this knowledge. They hear the music only after they play it from the written score. In the course of improvisation, their ‘eyes’ guide their ‘ears’ rather than the other way around.  

Many jazz educators and students understand the decline of listening as the result of the increased rationalization and professionalization – indeed modernization – of jazz training. For example, in an interview with a Boston Globe reporter that revolved around the topic of collegiate jazz education, the well-known jazz saxophonist, Branford Marsalis, himself an ardent critic of collegiate jazz education, made the following comments:

The times are different now. The talent level is severely diminished and that stuff that has replaced it has really put jazz in a bind because the music seems to lack any kind of substance in regards to humanness or humanity. It’s very professional, like think-tank music. Jazz is in trouble. (Young 2006)

Marsalis’s words in this vignette and elsewhere suggest an opposition between, on the one hand, the increased rationalization and professionalization of jazz training that are conducive to the abstraction and reification of the music (processes that he indexes via the notion of ‘think-tank music’ that itself connotes visually mediated theory within this genre of criticism (see Ake 2002; Nicholson 2005)) and, on the other hand, ‘humanness’ and ‘humanity’, i.e. a more experientially oriented approach to music that does not rely heavily on abstract theory. His words invoke Max Weber’s description of the bureaucratic or professional class as ‘specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart’ (Weber 2001:182).

These concerns have motivated the students I worked with to orchestrate and enter into game-like interactions, which I argue constitute a form of what Michael Foucault has called ‘technologies of the self’. In these interactions they collectively attempted to craft and also compete with one another over their ability to display culturally sanctioned modes of agency that focus on listening and thus to reverse the sensory manifestations of a very specific modernization process, i.e. the professionalization of jazz training.  

Technologies of the Self as a Potential form of Sensory Agency

Foucault developed the notion of technologies of the self late in his career after providing a genealogy of Western discourses that objectified the self as an object of study and control. Following this analysis of ‘regimes of truth’, Foucault explored technologies of the self, i.e. ways in which individuals constitute
themselves as subjects via the enactment of such discourses (see Rabinow 1997). He offered a genealogy of Western technologies of the self beginning from antiquity, and in the process emphasized a number of continuities in terms of methods of self-cultivation.

At the most basic level, technologies of the self are ‘a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rule of procedure, may be considered valid or invalid, winning or losing’ (Foucault 1997:297). This formulation immediately lends itself to the theorization of the communicative events I described above, which involve a very conspicuous procedure of verification to ascertain a specific result and the identity of a winner and a looser. Although Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of the self’ is often featured in anthropological research to designate work that individuals perform on themselves, the notion as originally developed by Foucault has a number of dimensions that often remain unspecified in such discussions. These dimensions make explicit the notion’s relevance for theorizing the strategies individuals might devise to cultivate their sensory agency as a way of negotiating historical change. Hence it is worth discussing these dimensions in some detail.

First, in the broadest terms, inasmuch as they are defined as ‘the procedures, which no doubt exist in every civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge’ (Foucault 1997:87), technologies of the self are about the possibility of self-fashioning in view of specific ends. Thus, they suggest the possibility of sensory self-fashioning vis-à-vis modernity’s sensory manifestations.

Second, Foucault makes it clear that ‘... if I am now interested in how the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group’ (Foucault 1997:291). Thus, in arguing for the possibility of sensory agency, I am not postulating the existence of some kind of an autonomous or carnival-esque space within the presumed oppressive sphere of modern rationality. Rather, multiple and conflicting ‘regimes of truth’ often circulate simultaneously with one another and individuals can choose to fashion themselves in accordance with one or more of these discourses. The jazz students I worked with embrace a discourse of listening-oriented performance authenticity that they learn from their teachers. The latter are aware of the contribution of collegiate jazz education to the standardization of the music and hence they try to
convey to their students the criteria for the production of ‘real’ jazz as they understand it.

Third, while technologies of the self are linked to institutions of power, this does not mean they have no basis in reality (Foucault 1997:296). Accordingly, I do not argue that the standardization of jazz music as a product of the specific modes of socialization that are prevalent in collegiate jazz education is a fiction. The concerns about students’ sensory skills, while shaped by a specific regime of truth, are grounded in observable experiential phenomena.

Fourth, most importantly, Foucault postulates the existence of technologies of the self that are concerned with a notion of ethics as embodied dispositions that are conducive to the performance of culturally sanctioned actions (Foucault 1997:209; for the use of a similar notion of ethics, see Asad 1993; Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006). The purpose of these techniques is to make a specific discursive truth incorporated, absorbed, and assimilated into one’s body so that it becomes part of oneself as a ‘permanent principle of action’ (Foucault 1988:35; 1997:99–103). Foucault describes various technologies of the self that focus on embodied dispositions that were used in antiquity such as abstinence and physical exercises. This suggests that techniques of the self can be concerned with the honing of sensory skills that are defined as the seat of moral agency in a culturally specific context.

Fifth, the self is not a single unitary entity. Rather, it is heterogeneous in accordance with the multiplicity of contexts in which one acts: ‘You do not have the same relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfill your desires in a sexual relationship’ (Foucault 1997:290). Thus, I argue that the games played by the students I worked with are concerned with a specific model of the self that is dominant in the context of collegiate jazz education and that emphasizes ‘listening’ to oneself and to other players in one’s group as a moral imperative (see Duranti & Burrell 2004; Black 2008:284). This self exists side by side with other models of the self that students hold in their various capacities other than jazz students.

Sixth, there might be various forms of training, from thought experiments to entering into real situations, where one has to demonstrate that he or she has the discursive truth incorporated within him or her (Foucault 1988:35; 1997:102–3). The games I discuss belong to the second type of training. Students often put themselves in situations in which they have to display their listening
skills in real-time in front of their friends. Such micro-practices form the backbone of technologies of the self.

Seventh, technologies of the self need not be a solitary activity. Rather, they can involve teachers, private counselors, family relations, friends, and so forth (Foucault 1997:97–9). Similarly, the games I discuss are a form of technologies of the self that are enacted among a number of friends who perform for one another a quasi ‘soul service’ (Foucault 1997:99). They help one another hone the desired model of selfhood that is based on listening.

Finally, it is perhaps not accidental that Foucault calls technologies of the self ‘games of truth’, by which he means, as I noted above, ‘a set of rules by which truth is produced. It is not a game in the sense of an amusement; it is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rule of procedure, may be considered valid or invalid, winning or losing’ (Foucault 1997:297). This is a very adequate definition of the interactions I am concerned with, in which students negotiate with one another a set of rules for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are endowed with the skill of listening or not, and for cultivating this skill at the same time.¹²

These various dimensions give analytical thickness to the study of the ways in which individuals might negotiate modernity’s sensory manifestations by devising micro-practices of sensory self-fashioning. In the next section, I provide an additional example for such practices. As I show, while the students I worked with often reverted to singing and whistling in order to cultivate their listening skills, ultimately it was their ability to exercise listening on their musical instruments that determined their improvisatory skills. Hence they came up with games of truth that focused precisely on this task.

‘Nail it on the Trumpet’: Honing Listening on Musical Instruments

One Friday night I met with Pierre, a guitar student, for our weekly playing session in Commonwealth’s guitar department. Sarah, the vibraphone student, and Carla, a singer, were present too. We played together a couple of tunes, I on trumpet, Pierre on guitar, Sarah on percussion, and Carla singing. After an hour of playing we decided to take a break. I went to a corner and played random lines. I continued with this for a few seconds. One note that I played at the end of a phrase was cracked. I stopped and tried to play it properly for a couple of times. Upon hearing this, Pierre, who all this time sat quietly, took his guitar and tried to play the exact same pitch. He missed my note by two whole steps above. He then hesitantly descended in a glissando until he found the correct pitch. I could not help myself and laughed, saying, ‘Man,
that was funny!' I then imitated the glissando with my voice. As I was about to continue with my playing, Carla interjected, standing up and saying: ‘Oh yeah? Let’s see you do better than him!’ ‘What do you mean?’ I asked. Carla went to Pierre and pulled him toward me. ‘Come, you stand here’, she said, directing him with her hands. Pierre was laughing. ‘And you’, she said to me, turning me around with her hands, ’you stand with your back to him’. Pierre and I were now standing back to back. ‘Pierre, play some notes. I don’t want him to remember what you played’, Carla said. Pierre was confused and asked ‘What?’ Carla then reached with her hand and moved Pierre’s hand all over the guitar’s neck, thereby producing a cacophony of sounds. She thus hoped to disorient me so that I would not remember what Pierre had played when he had tried to match the cracked note that I produced earlier. ‘Now play one note’, she told Pierre, ‘and you’, she turned to me, ‘you need to nail it on the trumpet. Let’s see you do better than him!’ There was silence. Sarah looked at us attentively from her seat. I stared forward, trying to focus, preparing myself. Do I know my trumpet that well? My thoughts were abruptly cut short. Pierre plucked a string and a note sounded in the air. I pondered for a second, trying to figure out where to place it on the trumpet, what note on my trumpet would match it. I played a D, then immediately, with urgency, like the reflex reaction when one pulls one’s hand away from fire, I changed it a whole step below to a C, only to realize that Pierre had actually played a C#, which I then quickly played. ‘It doesn’t count, it doesn’t count’, Carla exclaimed, waiving her hands in dismissal while Sarah, shaking her head, muttered ‘No, no, no’.

As a first step toward interpreting this interaction, notice that according to the jazz educators I worked with, the musical instrument can pose a problem if approached in the wrong way. While teachers understand that the instrument is an inevitable component of playing, they insist that it must be approached via one’s ‘ears’ so that it may become an unproblematic medium for the expression of the player’s musical ideas in the real-time of improvisation, much like in singing or whistling. One teacher described this ideal of symbiosis between the musician and his or her musical instrument, as well as a technique for developing it, in the following way:

When you’re starting playing things in every key every day you start recognizing the difference between the key of A and the key of C and the key of B flat on the instrument. You feel it. It’s a strange thing. I can’t explain it but you start developing a relative pitch from your fingers to your ears, you know. So if I hear somebody playing in a certain
key, I’ll relate [it] to my instrument – whatever it is – tenor or alto [saxophone] and say: ‘that key feels like that note on my horn.’ You know what I mean? So I’ll relate [it] to maybe the tenor and say: ‘yeah, that sounds like it’s in the key of A’ because I can feel … actually the fingering in my fingers of the horn. It’s really a strange thing but it does work but only if you do it every day. If you only play like in three keys, C, F, and B flat all the time you won’t get it. But if you do all the keys … you kind of feel it in your hands … I’ll listen to, you hear something on the radio and it’s like: ‘oh yeah, that’s in the key of E’ … I can actually feel that note. The color, yeah, you get the color right. That’s what that’s like. But it takes time, don’t get me wrong.

The teacher describes a delicately achieved indexicality between the sounds one hears and the way their production on one’s instrument ‘feels’ like. The production of each note on an instrument involves the combination of numerous bodily actions and sensations such as pressing this specific finger, breathing this amount of air, tightening the lips to this degree, etc. Each note produced on an instrument, therefore, entails a specific and distinct configuration of bodily actions and sensations, what I would call its specific ‘bodily signature’. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, ‘to get used to a hat, a car or a [blind man’s] stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our body’. It is ‘knowledge bred of familiarity’ that is embodied and non-representational (Merleau-Ponty 2002:166).

However, as the teacher makes it clear, how one makes oneself familiar with the instrument is crucial. One does not want to breed the ‘wrong’ kind of familiarity by relying exclusively on visually mediated modes of knowledge production and transmission. He describes one technique for cultivating the desirable symbiosis with the instrument, which consists of repeatedly playing a pattern in each of the 12 keys without the mediation of a written score. After practicing in this way for a long time the player starts to form an association between each of the notes that she hears as she produces it on her instrument and what I call the note’s specific ‘bodily signature’, i.e. how it feels to produce each of these notes.¹³ I would argue that when the teacher refers to ‘the colors, yeah, you get the color right’, he points to this bodily signature. Feeling it ‘in my fingers’, ‘in your hands’, is a way of describing this subtle conditioning.

This kind of mastery is important in jazz because of the music’s improvisatory basis, which requires players to respond to the constantly changing musical situation in real-time. If a player is able to locate on his instrument the musical ideas that form in his head and the sounds that his band members produce as they improvise, he can execute the former and respond to the latter in real-time, thus contributing to the music in a way which
makes musical sense. The game that Pierre and I played in front of Carla and Sarah was concerned precisely with the ability to match an external (or imagined) sound with our instruments, a skill that requires prolonged practice. Upon hearing the note that Pierre played, I had an embodied sensation of what that sound ‘felt’ like on the trumpet. I was close – a half step above – but not close enough. Part of the epistemological crisis that pervades collegiate jazz education at the present moment revolves around the realization that because students do not use their ears as much as players of previous generations they have a hard time responding in real-time to the musical cues produced by their band members or executing the musical ideas that form in their own heads. This severely compromises the production of group improvisation as an emergent structure and instead makes it repetitive and predictable (Sawyer 1996).

Students are exposed at school to some versions of this specific game of truth, which is meant to mitigate these implications. Thus, in one of the few courses at Commonwealth that were dedicated to the cultivation of listening, the teacher would often play a note or a chord on the piano and the students would have to match what he played on their instruments. Significantly, he would not allow them to ‘slide’ toward the right note when they missed it as I did in the game of truth I described above. In an interview I conducted with this teacher, he explained to me the rationale behind this restriction in the following way:

To me they are just digging around. I want them to actually hear it first. If they do that [i.e. search for the note on their instruments] then they don’t trust their ears. I want them to trust their ears… I think it develops your inner ear so that you can hear things without actually having to play them. You can hear ways to approach tunes. Like if you get to know what’s the sound of a certain chord progression, if you hear that progression in your ear then you can know where to find it [on the instrument].

The teacher explains that allowing a student to ‘slide’ toward the correct pitch after he missed it the first time is not as conducive to the development of listening as forbidding him to do so. Once the student played a note on the instrument it is fairly easy for him to slide to the correct pitch that was played by the teacher. ‘Nailing it’ the first time, however, is a totally different story. It demonstrates that one has achieved the kind of symbiosis with the instrument that allows him or her to play intentionally and editorially, as it were, in the...
real-time of improvisation. The game of truth that Pierre and I played was concerned with displaying, but also providing the opportunity to cultivate, this skill.

During the year in which I worked with this group of students and other students, I witnessed a number of different games of truth they devised, which were concerned with the fashioning of a self defined in terms of aural skills. One game involved a competition between students over who can provide the most creative improvisation with found objects. Another game required students to accurately sing tunes’ melodies, starting from random points and at unexpected times. In yet another game, students competed with one another over who would be the first to recognize the identity of canonical players just from listening to recordings randomly chosen by a digital player. For lack of space, I cannot elaborate on the intricacies of each of these games. Suffice it here to say that they all functioned as different versions of what I have called ‘technologies of the listening self’, which emerged as a response to cultural anxieties about the decline in students’ aural skills as a result of their professional training at school.

**Conclusion: Modernization and Sensory Agency**

In this article, I have theorized the micro-practices individuals might devise to actively negotiate the reconfiguration of their sensory skills as a result of modernization processes. I have suggested that an ethnographic focus on sensory self-fashioning should complement recent anthropological studies of individuals’ attempts to produce distinctly sensuous objects such as comestibles as a way of negotiating the effects of global forces of standardization and rationalization. These micro-practices of sensory retraining are anchored in specific discourses and regimes of truth. Critical reflexive commentary on the standardizing effects of global processes of rationalization publicly circulates and allows individuals to fashion technologies of the self that are supposed to mitigate these effects. Ethnographic sensitivity to such practices of sensory self-fashioning is necessary to further challenge narratives of modernity’s presumed all-encompassing scope and reach.

At the same time, it is important to note that these games of truth are agonistic in nature and thus result in the reproduction of ‘listening’ as a scarce resource. The practice of ‘nailing’ a random sound on one’s instrument or imitating it by whistling is a challenge for other students to do the same. Although they function as training ground that allows students to develop and cultivate such skills, these practices are often zero-sum games, i.e. they are sites of competition that by definition transform ‘listening’ into a scarce resource. To
participate and to invite other students to participate in these kinds of inter-
actions amount to ascertaining who from among the students embodies the
‘truth’, defined according to specific criteria, and who does not; who can
demonstrate and enact performance authenticity and who cannot. One of
these practices’ ironic aspects, then, is that at the same time that they constitute
a strategy of negotiating the decline of listening they also reproduce some par-
ticipants as lacking in it.

The nature of such technologies as micro-practices suggests that moderniz-
ation cannot be studied only through the ‘official’ and most visible practices but
must be complemented by so-called ‘informal’ practices that take place in their
shadow. Much of the negotiation of modernity’s sensory manifestations takes
place in the context of these invisible, mundane, and spontaneous interactions
between subjects. In its commitment to remain close to practice and everyday
life, anthropology is well situated to explore these interactions and events
whose analysis, as Foucault argued, is difficult because they ‘do not require
the same material apparatus as the production of objects [and] therefore …
are often invisible techniques’ (Foucault 1997:277). By unearthing these tech-
niques, then, anthropologists can contribute a great deal to the study of the
ways in which individuals participate in the production and reproduction of
their own sensory agency vis-à-vis modernity’s institutional affordances and
limitations.

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Notes
1. ‘Commonwealth’ and ’Midtown’, as well as the names of all students and teachers,
are pseudonyms. I conducted fieldwork in these two schools from July 2006 to June
2008.
2. Indeed, this game and the game I discuss on pages 17 and 18 are modeled on the
agonistic exchange of the ‘jam session’ (DeVeaux 1997: 208–13), which is itself
part of genred African-American agonistic interactions such as the ‘dozens’ and
'sounding', i.e. verbal games of artful insults. I thank Webb Keane for pointing this out to me.

3. By 'modernization processes' I mean the unfolding of processes historically associated with modernity such as rationalization (see Hirschkind 2006: 40 and passim). My use of this term is divorced from the teleological meaning that has often been associated with it in some strands of social theory influenced by Hegel's notion of history, as I explain on pp. 6–7.

4. But see Benjamin's argument about the re-enchanting sensory potentialities of modern media in Benjamin (1969b).

5. Indeed, a different theoretical strand has challenged the very notion of a unified modernity to begin with, highlighting instead the existence of multiple and alternative modernities, i.e. the fact that modernity always unfolds in culturally specific ways in different cultural contexts and at different times (Sahlins 2000; Gaonkar 2001).

6. Anthropologists have also recently provided fascinating accounts of contemporary forms of sensory socialization among neophyte professionals (Rice 2010). However, these accounts do not focus on the relation between such socialization and modernization processes, with which I am concerned in this article.

7. Academic jazz programs' heavy reliance on visually mediated modes of knowledge production and transmission has been over-determined by at least four factors. First, because jazz programs are commonly hosted within music schools in which Western classical music has been long institutionalized, they have seamlessly adopted the institutional arrangements of these schools, of which the typographic medium plays a key role (Nettl 1995: 36). Second, many jazz programs have adopted the typographic medium as a prestige-conferring strategy in jazz's long battle for cultural legitimacy (Lopes 2002) and against the backdrop of its systematic marginalization as a result of its improvisatory and presumed 'oral' nature (Gioia 1990: 50–69). Third, the professionalization of jazz necessitated the adoption of the professional ethos that mandates standardized and rationalized cognitive knowledge testable against clear-cut criteria. Jazz programs have adopted the typographic medium as a convenient means for the delineation of the knowledge that a jazz student should master, how that knowledge should be conveyed to the student, and how the student should be tested (Ake 2002). Lastly, the typographic medium allows the transmission of knowledge to more students simultaneously and in 'a short amount of time', as one teacher told me, thus pointing at cost-efficiency considerations that play a key role in the market-oriented academic jazz education that prioritizes increases in enrollment numbers (Porter 1989: 138). Thus educators continue to use visually mediated pedagogies even as they are aware of their potentially problematic impact on their students' improvisational skills.

8. For a detailed description of the various stages in which students acquire these embodied playing habits during their studies, see Wilf (2010). A more complete analysis of such acquisition would have to take into account students' training prior to their enrollment in jazz programs and also the pathways into formal jazz education taken by them. For lack of space I can only note in passing that the
The impact of academic jazz education has been rampant also outside of the physical confines of jazz programs because pedagogical method books and aids developed within the context of academic jazz education have become the standard in jazz pedagogy at large, e.g., in amateur musicians' independent study at home and also in jazz education at the high-school level. On the wide commodification of jazz pedagogical material in the American context, see Chinen (2007).

For a detailed analysis of this quote, see Wilf (2010: 572).

The tension at the heart of the ethnographic context I highlight in this article, in which jazz is a site of both the standardizing forces associated with modernity and the creation of a counter-narrative to these forces, has been a key feature throughout jazz's history. At times, jazz has been cast as the cultural epitome of modern standardization (Adorno 1982; see Wilf 2010: 579 for a critique of Adorno's take on jazz). At other times, it has inspired the production of counter-narratives to modern standardization and homogenization not only in the field of music at different locales around the globe (see Ansell 2005 for a South African context) but also in different branches of twentieth-century artistic modernism (Belgrad 1998; Nettelbeck 2005: 95–188). At the same time, some of artistic modernism's borrowing from jazz as the epitome of creativity was based in misunderstandings about the nature of improvisation as if it were a mystical creation ex nihilo (Ramshaw 2006) and in various appropriations of blackness as a locus of authenticity (Gioia 1990: 19–49). Rather than creation ex nihilo, improvisation is a form of composition in the spur of the moment that relies on previously available building blocks of various sorts weaved together according to various contextual factors (Sawyer 1996; Lord 2003).

This analytical sensitivity to the existence of multiple circulating discourses within which specific sensory impressions receive their meaning is important to note because the sensuous does not exist in the object apart from a cultural system that gives it its meaning. The negative evaluation of standardization as perceived by individuals in objects is not self-evident but is grounded in culturally specific notions of sensory value (see Howes 2006: 45).

This might suggest that Foucault added an important dimension to the history of the theorization of play and games in social theory in the context of which – at least as far as anthropology is concerned – play has been viewed as either pure waste that does not deserve consideration, as in Marxist approaches, or as an affirmation of an already existent meaning, as in hermeneutic approaches informed by the writings of Clifford Geertz (Malaby 2009). According to Foucault, playing games of truth, whose logic often incorporates open-endedness and contingency (Foucault 1997: 300), is a process of productive self-formation, i.e. it is neither waste nor the necessary affirmation of an already existing meaning.

This skill is probably more complicated than that. I would hypothesize that the 'bodily signature' of each note also varies according to the notes that precede and follow it. For example, the bodily signature of a single A note played on any instrument might be different from the bodily signature of an A note that is part of an A major triad. In other words, it would be simplistic to consider the bodily aspects of the production of music through the analytic category of the single note.
References


